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CHAPTER ONE 
This Chapter gives an introduction and sets out the framework for the research. 
1. General Introduction 
Heinous and egregious crimes can be traced far back in human history. Correspondingly, the 
concept to end impunity by penalising perpetrators of atrocities, regardless of geographical 
boundaries, has raised perpetual concern in the society. Werle rightly observes: 
„The idea of universal criminal justice has its roots far back in human history. But only in 
the 20
th
 century did such ideas begin to be conceptualised as legal issues.‟1 
However, the conception to end impunity for such crimes by creating an International Criminal 
Court equipped with universal jurisdiction did not materialise. Rather, it culminated into the 
creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) which does not have universal jurisdiction.
2
 
The ICC came into being by the adoption of the Rome Statute (the Statute) on 17
 
July 1998.
3
 By 
11
 
April 2002, 66 States had ratified the Statute thereby satisfying the threshold of 60 State 
ratifications required for the Statute to enter force.
4
 In line with Article 126, the Statute entered 
into force on 1
 
July 2002.
5
 It confers jurisdiction on the ICC over the crime of genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes and possibly the crime of aggression.
6
 The Preamble to the Statute 
and Article 1 assert that the ICC shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions. This 
entails that the primary duty to investigate and prosecute international crimes falls on domestic 
                                                            
1 Werle (2009: 3). 
2 See Werle (2009: 64). 
3 See Struett (2008: 134). 
4 See Struett (2008: 138). See also Art.126 ICC Statute. 
5See „United Nations Treaty Collection.‟ 
6 See Art. 5 ICC Statute. See also Kreβ and Holtzendorff (2010: 1217). 
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criminal tribunals. Therefore, the Court‟s jurisdiction is subsidiary to municipal courts because it 
is only triggered if there is inaction, unwillingness or inability genuinely to investigate or 
prosecute by the domestic courts.
7
 In addition, the Statute provides for the mechanisms 
commonly referred to as the „trigger mechanisms‟8 through which matters can be brought before 
the Court for trial.
9
 Two of the said trigger mechanisms are the objects of analysis in this 
research paper in so far as the principle of complementarity is concerned. 
1.1. Complementarity in UNSC Referred Situations 
The duplicative assertion of complementarity in the Preamble and the substantive part of the 
Statute are a manifestation of the fundamentality attached to the principle by States Parties.
10
 
However, some writers have contended that the position between the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) referring a situation to the ICC
11
 and the extent to which complementarity will 
apply is unclear.
12
 In this regard, there is an argument that a UNSC referral of a situation to the 
ICC effectively nullifies complementarity and vests the ICC with primacy in terms of 
jurisdiction.
13
 Proponents of this view contend that UN Member States have conferred on the 
UNSC the primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security in the UN Charter 
(Charter).
14
 Therefore, the Charter obligation to accept and carry out the decisions of the UNSC 
negatives the complementarity requirement.
15
 
                                                            
7 See McGoldrick, Rowe and Donnelly (2004: 83). 
8 See Schiff (2008: 78). 
9 See Art. 13 ICC Statute.  
10 See Kleffner (2008: 99). 
11 See Art. 13 (b) ICC Statute. 
12 See Benzing (2003: 625). 
13 See Newton (2001: 49). 
14 See Art. 24 (1) Charter.  
15 See Lauwaars (1983/84: 1605-06). 
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To begin with, it must be noted that Article 17 of the Statute containing the principle of 
complementarity remains silent on this point.
16
 However, it can be argued that the Statute 
envisages the application of complementarity even in situations referred to the ICC by the 
UNSC.
17
 This is deducible, inter alia, from the power of the Court to determine, on its own 
motion, the admissibility of a case and the requirement on the part of the Prosecutor to consider 
the admissibility of a case before deciding to initiate an investigation.
18
 
Notwithstanding this theoretical normative framework, the author contends that it is 
unfathomable that the Prosecutor or even the Court would hold a UNSC referral inadmissible
19
 
thereby leaving the UNSC with the option, inter alia, to establish the costly ad hoc tribunals – a 
trend the UNSC is endeavouring to avoid.
20
 Thus, pragmatism renders it highly unlikely bearing 
in mind the UNSC‟s influential position. By adopting a Chapter VII resolution under the Charter 
to refer a situation to the ICC, the UNSC makes a determination that the situation being referred 
to the Court is a threat to, or a breach of peace.
21
 Inevitably, this creates a nexus between the 
juridical mandate of the Court on the one hand and the peace and security responsibility of the 
UNSC on the other hand. According to the author, this greatly undermines the independence of 
the Court as envisioned by the Statute and practically renders „complementarity‟ an apparition.  
That notwithstanding, a further challenge arises from a presupposition that a UNSC resolution 
referring a situation to the ICC declared it admissible.
22
 The legal and practical consequences 
flowing from such a scenario merit investigation. This is particularly in the face of arguments 
                                                            
16 See Pichon (1998: 189). 
17 See Lattanzi and Schabas (1999: 84). 
18 See Arts. 19 (1) and 53 (1) (b) ICC Statute. 
19 See Sarooshi (2004: 101). 
20 See Arsanjani (1999: 28). 
21 See Art. 39 Charter. 
22 See Benzing (2003: 626). 
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that UN Member States would be bound because in their treaty obligations under the Charter, 
they have undertaken to accept and carry out the decisions of the UNSC.
23
 Additionally, the 
question whether the ICC would be bound by such a decision of the UNSC raises concern.
24
 The 
fact that the Statute intends the ICC to be an independent and impartial international 
organisation
25
 does not of itself necessarily answer the question.
26
 
A further argument has been made that, since the UNSC has the power to establish ad hoc 
tribunals with primary jurisdiction, it must a maiore ad minus have the power to vest an existing 
complementary court with primacy.
27
 Undeniably, the crimes under the ICC‟s jurisdiction 
threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world. Therefore, the prevention and 
punishment of the crimes by the ICC entail, inter alia, contributing to the maintenance and 
restoration of international peace and security. To this end, the ICC President noted: 
 „The Rome Statute‟s express purpose overlaps with the goals of the UN. [...] To achieve 
our collective aims, our institutions must work together […] Cooperation is important 
because the Court and the UN are part of an interdependent system of international law 
and justice.‟28  
 
 
 
                                                            
23 See Arts. 25 and 103 Charter. 
24 See Benzing (2003: 626).  
25 See Art. 40 ICC Statute. 
26 See Oosthuizen (1999: 313). 
27 See Stigen (2008: 241). 
28 Stigen (2008: 236). 
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Similarly, other writers have observed that: 
„It was foreseeable that when the Rome Statute of 1998 establishing the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) was adopted the relationship between the UN Security Council and 
the Court was going to be an uncomfortable one.‟29 
Thus the subject matter jurisdiction of the ICC „straying‟ into the primary responsibility of the 
UNSC or vice versa is a particularly worrisome matter in so far as the complementarity regime 
envisioned by the ICC Statute is concerned. 
1.2. Complementarity in Self-Referred Situations  
Further, the practice by some States Parties (the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Uganda, 
the Central African Republic and Mali) to refer to the ICC situations occurring on their own 
territories has given rise to tension within the proper construction of complementarity generally 
and the procedural setting of the concept in particular.
30
 The proper construction entails a general 
assumption that complementarity will avail Member States a pre-emptive measure against the 
Court‟s action either by instituting proceedings in their domestic criminal courts, asking for a 
deferral
31
 or challenging  admissibility.
32
 Whereas the Statute recalls that it is the duty of 
Member States to exercise their criminal jurisdictions over perpetrators of international crimes,
33
 
self-referrals „seem to abdicate this duty‟ by claiming inability which, though compatible with 
the intent of justice, maybe incompatible with complementarity.
34
 The question whether a self-
referred situation to the ICC amounts to an abdication of the Rome Statute duty of member states 
                                                            
29 Doria, Gasser and Bassiouni (2009: 455). 
30 See Kleffner in Stahn and Sluiter (2009: 41-54). 
31 See Art. 18 (2) ICC Statute. 
32 See Art. 19 ICC Statute. 
33 See Preambular paragraph 6 ICC Statute. 
34 See Kleffner in Stahn and Sluiter (2009: 41-2). 
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to prosecute grave crimes of an international dimension requires determination. The perceptible 
incompatibility between self-referrals and complementarity gives rise to the need for analysis 
whether, and to what extent complementarity generally, and the procedural construction 
particularly apply in such cases. 
Consequently, some have contended that if domestic criminal tribunals are able and willing to 
prosecute as envisioned by the Statute, relinquishment of jurisdiction conflicts the 
complementarity principle, the fundamental purpose of which confers on national criminal 
jurisdictions the primary duty to investigate and prosecute grave international crimes.
35
 On the 
other hand, others have argued that self-referrals can legitimately be made where the referring 
States have neither commenced investigations nor prosecutions, as there could be valid purposes 
for the referring states to abdicate their jurisdiction (hence, conceptualising such referrals as 
„waivers of complementarity‟).36  
Contrariwise, it appears questionable whether the mere fact that a State makes a self-referral 
would automatically entail such a waiver,
37
 more so that waivers or renunciations of claims or 
rights of States must either be express or unequivocally implied from the conduct of the State 
alleged to have waived or renounced its right.
38
  
These contentions border on the complementary regime of the ICC. Hence, the author has been 
motivated to test and analyse the underlying legal framework of the concept, its rationale and the 
extent to which it applies in the cases in casu.  
 
                                                            
35 See Preambular paragraphs 4, 6, 10 and Art. 1 ICC Statute 
36 See Akhavan (2010: 103). 
37 See Kleffner in Stahn and Sluiter (2009: 43). 
38 See Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia) (Preliminary Objections) [1992] ICJ Rep 247-50. 
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2. Research Question 
What does complementarity, as envisioned in the Statute, practically and theoretically entail?  
3. Objectives of Study. 
The Rome Statute provides: 
„An International Criminal Court (“the Court”) is hereby established. It shall be a 
permanent institution and shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons 
for the most serious crimes of international concern, as referred to in this Statute, and 
shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.‟39 
As noted above, the ICC exercises derivative jurisdiction because Member States deemed it fit to 
repose the primary responsibility to prosecute international crimes in domestic criminal 
jurisdictions of States Parties.
40
 For this reason, the Court‟s jurisdiction is said to be 
complementary or to complement that of domestic criminal courts of Member States, hence the 
term „complementarity‟. 
However, the principle of complementarity has generated a myriad of legal, academic and 
professional discourses among various stakeholders in the international criminal justice 
dispensation system. On the one hand, the challenges have gained momentum in the light of the 
recent UNSC referral of the situations in Sudan and Libya to the ICC. This stems from the fact 
that the relationship between the UNSC referring a situation to the Court and the application of 
the complementarity regime is unclear.
41
 Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 18 and 19 of 
                                                            
39 Art.1 ICC Statute. 
40 See Art.1 ICC Statute. 
41 See Benzing (2003: 625-26). 
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the Statute, some scholars have argued that complementarity as such does not apply to UNSC 
referrals
42
 while others have contended otherwise.
43
 
On the other hand, the self-referred situations to the ICC by Uganda, the DRC, the Central 
African Republic and Mali have raised controversy within the proper construction of 
complementarity. Based on the complementarity principle, one such conundrum has been 
Uganda‟s threat to withdraw the self-referral which was later reiterated several times by 
government officials. Although the question of withdrawal of a State Party referral has never 
been officially brought up before the Court, the statements made by the Ugandan Government 
herald the possibility of facing such a question in the future.
44
 
In an endeavour to address the above and further related questions, the author will: 
I. Evaluate the Court‟s jurisdictional reach. 
II. Analyse UNSC referrals to the Court against the admissibility requirement envisioned 
by the Statute. Due regard will be paid to the treaty obligations emanating from the 
Charter and the ICC Statute. The legal effects of a possible UNSC resolution deciding 
on admissibility will also be analysed. 
III.  Assess the legal basis of duty to prosecute, the framework for complementarity in 
self-referrals and the practical effect of treating self-referrals as waivers of 
complementarity. 
IV.  Examine the possibility and legal basis of withdrawal of a State Party referral bearing 
in mind that the Statute, the Rules and the Regulations make no express provisions. 
                                                            
42 See Newton (2001: 49). 
43 See Holmes (2002: 683). 
44 See El Zeidy (2008: 56). 
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4. Significance of Study 
The author intends to contribute to the discourse on the subject. In turn, this will enable readers 
to have a theoretical understanding of complementarity and to appreciate the practical 
conundrums around the subject. The author will also contribute to the enrichment of academic 
knowledge. 
5.  Scope of Research 
This research revolves around ICC and/or UN Member States. Therefore, such States will be 
mentioned as and when a need has arisen in the course of the paper. 
6. Hypothesis 
The author is inclined to the view that ideally, the principle of complementarity will apply 
regardless of the trigger mechanism through which a situation is referred to the ICC. However, 
practical challenges arise when the UNSC has adopted a resolution under Chapter VII of the 
Charter that a particular situation is a threat to international peace and security and decides to 
refer the matter to the ICC. Further, that self-referred situations to the ICC do not, and should not 
amount to waivers of complementarity. It is also the author‟s view that once a situation is self-
referred to the ICC, it becomes impossible for the self-referring state to withdraw the matter from 
the Court. 
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7. Research Methodology 
The study will be conducted through desktop research. This will entail reading and analysing 
primary sources such as international conventions, resolutions, treaties and other relevant 
international legal instruments. Secondary resources will include books, journal articles, and 
electronic resources. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
In this Chapter, the author gives a brief introduction to the ICC before discussing the following 
concepts: Jurisdictional competency of the ICC, consent requirement of treaty law, 
complementarity and admissibility. 
1. Development of the ICC 
1.1. The Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials 
In their determination to punish the Nazis for war crimes, the Allied Powers (UK, USA, France 
and the Soviet Union) considered the idea of international prosecutions during and after World 
War II.
45
 In 1945, they convened at the London Conference where they established and adopted 
the Charter of the International Military Tribunal (IMT) to prosecute and punish the major war 
criminals of the European Axis.
46
 Since the IMT Charter was adopted after the crimes had been 
committed, the IMT has been criticised, inter alia, as having applied the law ex post facto.
47
 
Later, the Allies passed Control Council Law No. 10 (CCL No. 10) which, unlike the IMT 
Charter, dispensed with the requirement that crimes against humanity be „in execution of or in 
connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the tribunal.‟48 This facilitated the 
prosecution of crimes committed against Germans prior to 1939, euthanasia of the disabled as 
well as persecution of the Jews.
49
 In 1946, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) 
unanimously affirmed the principles of international law recognized by the Nuremberg Tribunal 
and its judgment.
50
 The Allies also established an International Military Tribunal for the Far East 
                                                            
45 McGoldrick, Rowe and Donnelly (2004: 41). 
46 See Schabas (2004: 5). 
47 See Tomuschat (2006: 832-35). 
48 Doria, Gasser and Bassiouni (2009: 52). 
49 See Tomuschat (2006: 832-35). 
50 See Doria, Gasser and Bassiouni (2009: 52). 
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where Japanese war criminals were tried.
51
 However, Tokyo left no legacy comparable to 
Nuremberg.
52
  
1.2. The Ad Hoc Tribunals 
The crimes in Yugoslavia and Rwanda quickly changed the political landscape for the creation of 
an international criminal court. In February 1993, the wide range of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity in Bosnia led the UNSC to resolve to establish an International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.
53
  Later in November 1994, the UNSC resolved to create 
another ad hoc tribunal for Rwanda on request by the latter.
54
  
Unfortunately, ad hoc tribunals do not provide an ideal solution to armed conflicts of truly 
appalling cruelty because they are only established after crimes have been committed. Further, 
their jurisdiction is limited both in time and in space and they cannot guarantee a uniform 
application of the law.
55
 Contrariwise, a permanent international criminal court exists before 
crimes are committed and can better guarantee a uniform interpretation and enforcement of the 
law. 
2. Drafting of the ICC Statute 
The UN had simultaneously been working on codifying the crimes and the establishment of an 
international criminal court. This process percolated through the Genocide Convention, 1948 
which directly advocated the creation of an international criminal court with jurisdiction over 
                                                            
51 See McGoldrick, Rowe and Donnelly (2004: 20). 
52 See McGoldrick, Rowe and Donnelly (2004: 21). 
53 See UNSC Resolution 808 (1993). 
54 See Schabas (2004: 11). 
55 See Lattanzi and Schabas (1999: 10). 
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persons suspected of committing genocide.
56
 In July 1998, the UNGA passed a Final Act to 
establish the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom).
57
 The PrepCom was convened by the UNGA at 
its 1995 session to further develop the statute with the notion that a plenipotentiary conference 
would follow.
58
 The Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
international criminal court convened in June 1998, in Rome.
59
 More than 160 states were 
represented through their delegates and hundreds of NGOs took part in the negotiations either 
directly or through the Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC).
60
 NGO 
participation was particularly important because it provided summaries of early negotiation and 
rationale for certain compromises without which the delicate compromises attained in the early 
stages of negotiation would be susceptible to collapsing.
61
 
After much debate and negotiation, the Diplomatic Conference adopted the statute of the 
International Criminal Court on 17
 
July 1998.
62
 The requisite 60 ratifications threshold for the 
statute to enter force was reached on 11
 
April 2002.
63
 That notwithstanding, the statute would 
only become operational on the 1
st
 day of the month after the 60
th 
day of deposit of the 60
th
 
instrument of ratification.
64
   Hence, the statute entered force on 1 July 2002.  Thus, whereas the 
genealogy of the ICC can be traced to the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials, the concepts and 
codification of international criminal law had existed and have been developing since ancient 
times.
65
  
                                                            
56 See Sands (2003: 112). 
57 See Schiff (2008: 104). 
58 See Schiff (2008: 70). 
59See Schabas (2004: 15). 
60 See Schiff (2008: 70). 
61 See Struett (2008: 109). 
62 See Schabas (2004: 18). 
63 See Schabas (2004: 20). 
64 See Art. 126 ICC Statute. 
65 See Gow (2002: 11). 
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3. Jurisdictional Competency of the ICC 
The Statute is couched in a mandatory manner that the Court „shall satisfy itself that it has 
jurisdiction in any case brought before it.‟66 Jurisdiction refers to the framework and 
circumstances within which the ICC can properly discharge its functions. Schabas aptly states: 
„Jurisdiction refers to the legal parameters of the Court‟s operations, in terms of subject 
matter (jurisdiction ratione materiae), time (jurisdiction ratione temporis) and space 
(jurisdiction ratione loci) as well as over individuals (jurisdiction ratione personae).‟67 
ICC jurisdiction is circumscribed by Article 13 of the Statute which implicitly rejects the notion 
of universal jurisdiction.
68
 Accordingly, the ICC can only hear cases self-referred by a state 
party, those referred by the UNSC or where the Prosecutor initiates an investigation proprio 
motu. 
69
 When the UNSC refers a situation to the Prosecutor, it matters less whether or not the 
crime was committed on the territory of a member state just like the nationality of the perpetrator 
becomes irrelevant because consent is derived from the Charter.
70
 In ruling on the territorial and 
personal parameters in the Sudan situation that was referred to the Prosecutor by the UNSC, the 
Court stated that the territorial and personal jurisdictional limitations of the Court are 
inapplicable in cases referred to the Prosecutor by the UNSC acting under its Chapter VII powers 
of the Charter.
71
 For this reason, some have argued that UNSC referrals have the operational 
                                                            
66 Art. 19 (1) ICC Statute. 
67 Schabas (2004: 68). 
68 See Newton (2001: 49). 
69 See Art. 13 ICC Statute. 
70 See Werle (2009: 85). See also Art. 25 Charter. 
71 See Laughland. 
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effect of conferring on the Court a „back-door universal jurisdiction‟,72 a concept that was 
rejected during the negotiations. 
On the other hand, proprio motu investigations
73
 and referrals to the Prosecutor by States 
Parties
74
 are dependent on the territorial and personal jurisdiction of the Court.
75
 That is to say, 
the ICC will have jurisdiction only if the crime was committed on the territory of a member state 
or a non-member state that consents ad hoc to ICC jurisdiction or a national of either state.
76
 
Thus, except in cases referred to the Prosecutor by the UNSC, jurisdiction of the ICC is 
consensual in nature because it is based on the consent of states parties that have signed and 
ratified the Statute or a non-state party that consents ad hoc to the jurisdiction of the Court.
77
 The 
concept of „territory‟ includes jurisdiction over crimes committed on board a vessel or aircraft 
registered in a member state.
78
 Whereas the IMT had jurisdiction to declare certain Nazi 
Organisations criminal, the ICC only has jurisdiction over natural persons
79
 who have attained 
the age of 18 at the time of commission of the offence.
80
 Further, trials in absentia are not 
permitted under the Statute.
81
 
The subject matter jurisdiction of the Court, that is the crimes prosecutable before the ICC, is 
circumscribed to the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole; 
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and aggression.
82
 For the crime of aggression, the 
                                                            
72 See Driscoll (2004: 14). 
73 See Art. 13 (c) ICC Statute. 
74 See Art. 13 (a) ICC Statute. 
75 See Art. 12 (2) ICC Statute. 
76 See Art. 12 (3) ICC Statute. 
77 See Art. 12 ICC Statute. 
78 See Art. 12 (2) (a) ICC Statute. 
79 See Art. 25 (1) ICC Statute. 
80 See Art. 26 ICC Statute. 
81 See Art. 63 (1) ICC Statute. 
82 See Art. 5 ICC Statute.   
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Kampala Review Conference resolved to defer the Court‟s exercise of jurisdiction to a decision 
to be taken by Member States after 1 January 2017.
83
 
In terms of jurisdiction ratione temporis (time), the ICC only exercises jurisdiction in relation to 
crimes committed after the Statute entered force,
84
 in this case 1 July 2002.
85
 In the case of a 
state that becomes party to the Statute after it has already entered force, the Court will only have 
jurisdiction to crimes committed from the moment the Statute enters force with respect to that 
particular state, unless the State declares otherwise.
86
 This requirement has a nexus to, and is re-
enforced by Article 24 of the Statute which proscribes retroactive punishment of criminality. 
Therefore, the Statute leaves it to the municipal criminal courts to try and punish persons 
responsible for serious crimes committed prior to its entry into force. 
However, what remains doubtful is the Court‟s jurisdiction over „continuous crimes‟, particularly 
cases of „enforced disappearances‟ which are crimes against humanity under Article 7 of the 
Statute. A person could have been disappeared prior to the entry into force of the Statute and yet 
the crime would continue after the entry into force of the Statute as long as the disappearance 
continues.
87
 
3.1. ICC Jurisdiction v Treaty Consent Requirement 
As already seen, prosecutions in the ICC are consensual in nature. When the UNSC refers a 
situation to the ICC, States‟ consent to ICC jurisdiction is derived from ratification of the Charter 
and/or the Statute.
88
 Accordingly, a fundamental and basic principle of international treaty law is 
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that only states parties should be bound by a treaty.
89
 In a true Vattelian fashion, this entails that 
a treaty should not create rights and obligations for a third state without its consent.
90
 
However, the Statute dispenses with the need for ratification by national governments by 
conferring on the Court jurisdiction over nationals of non-party states in so far as the Court can 
preside over them if the crime was committed on the territory of a state party and that state party 
decides to refer the situation to the Court or the Prosecutor initiates proprio motu 
investigations.
91
 Similarly, the territory of a non-party state where the crime was committed 
could consent ad hoc to the jurisdiction of the Court and decide to refer the situation to the ICC 
or the Prosecutor may institute investigations in such a case.
92
 In both instances, states that have 
neither signed and ratified the ICC treaty nor accepted ad hoc the jurisdiction of the Court are 
exposed to its jurisdiction if their nationals are the alleged perpetrators. 
Using the United States of America as an example, the Statute exposes a US soldier acting on a 
foreign territory to the jurisdiction of the ICC if she or he commits a crime within the jurisdiction 
of the Court on that territory. Theoretically, that would be the case notwithstanding that the US is 
not a party to the ICC treaty and that the foreign territory is also non-party but only accepts ad 
hoc the jurisdiction of the Court.
93
 That would be the case even where the foreign territory is 
party to the Statute and decides to refer the situation to the ICC or the Prosecutor institutes 
investigations proprio motu. Practically, the US is likely to utilise its influence as one of the five 
permanent members of the UNSC to block such an investigation by, inter alia, deferring the 
                                                            
89 See Arts. 34-8 VCLT. 
90 See Art. 34 VCLT. 
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investigations.
94
 However, other non-party states may not avoid ICC jurisdiction over their 
nationals as they may be expected to cooperate with the Court in any request for arrest and 
surrender.
95
 
Complementarity appears to offer a panacea to this jurisdictional conundrum because the 
national judicial system may claim primacy to investigate and prosecute international crimes. 
However, the problem is still unresolved because the ICC could still hold that there was no 
genuine investigation or prosecution and the matter would still be admissible to the ICC. For the 
purpose of consensual jurisdiction in line with international treaty law, the US had proposed that 
the Court‟s jurisdiction under Article 12 should require the express approval of both the 
territorial state where the crime is alleged to have been committed as well as the state of 
nationality of the alleged perpetrator in an event that either was non-party to the ICC treaty.
96
 
The author admits that such a provision would not only prevent a perilous drift toward 
universalising jurisdiction to non-party states but also uphold the international treaty law concept 
of consensual obligations on treaty party states. Regrettably, the American view did not make it 
into the final text of the Rome Statute. 
The over-broad jurisdictional reach of the ICC is also discernible from the effect of amending 
Articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 of the Statute. Accordingly, if the ICC statute were amended to add new 
crimes to the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court or to revise the definitions of the existing 
crimes in the Statute, a state party can immunise its nationals from the jurisdiction of the Court 
by not accepting the amendment.
97
  However, nationals of non-party states who commit offences 
on other territories would be subject to the potential jurisdiction of the court if that other state 
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accepted jurisdiction of the Court on the amended offences – an indefensible overreach of 
jurisdiction.
98
 Article 12‟s potential jurisdictional violation of the principle of sovereign consent 
embedded in the Vienna Convention is a challenge. Scheffer argues that states not party to the 
Statute are exposed in ways that states parties are not and she illustrates this anomaly as follows: 
„With only the consent of a Saddam Hussein, even if Iraq does not join the treaty, the 
treaty text purports to provide the court with jurisdiction over American or other troops 
involved in international humanitarian action in Northern Iraq.‟99 
The poor draftsmanship of Article 12 of the Statute was partially cured by the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence (RPE) which provide that any non-party state that triggers an investigation thereby 
exposes its own conduct to the full scrutiny of the ICC.
100
 According to the author, this provision 
seeks only to deter politically-motivated charges but does not address the fundamental aspect of 
international treaty law that states cannot be bound without their consent.  
However, it can be said that one argument for prosecuting nationals of non-party states is that 
states have always prosecuted foreign nationals for offences committed within their territories 
(territorial jurisdiction) or simply because the citizens are victims (passive personality) or that 
the conduct merely affects the interests of that state (protective jurisdiction).
101
 In such cases, the 
consent of the foreign national‟s state is irrelevant. However, one can still argue that there is a 
distinction between the exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign national by a national criminal 
tribunal and handing over a defendant to the jurisdiction of an international organisation whose 
own state has refused to participate in. In the latter case, states are not obligated to participate in 
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an international organisation because they are founded on consent, the lynchpin of the Rome 
treaty.
102
 Even the Charter from which the UNSC derives its power and authority was consented 
to by states.
103
  
To counter the above contention, it has been argued that the Statute in Article 12 does not impose 
obligations on third states as such, but upon its nationals.
104
 Hans-Peter Kaul, leader of the 
German delegation at Rome has equally argued that the Statute does not impose obligations on 
third states as such but on nationals.
105
 Therefore, it is an individual criminal who is the 
independent object of international law and not an extension of his or her state. Seen from this 
perspective, it becomes clear that the Statute does not violate Article 34 of the Vienna 
Convention. The author‟s view is that the ICC merely provides fora because territorial 
jurisdiction on which Article 12 is based has long been recognised as a principle of law between 
states. Therefore, states could have delegated the exercise of this territorial jurisdiction to a 
supranational organisation like the ICC.
106
 
However, some have argued further that there is no precedent for states to delegate their 
territorial jurisdiction this way and that it amounts to a „material alteration‟ of the traditional 
understanding of territorial jurisdiction.
107
 Therefore, it should be inapplicable to states that do 
not consent to the Statute because states can opt to consent to universal and territorial jurisdiction 
to be exercised between states but object to it being exercised by an international organisation 
like the ICC. In the latter scenario, the burden imposed on states whose nationals may be subject 
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to prosecution before an international organisation is materially increased.
108
 Hence, the Statute 
is seen as obliterating nation‟s sovereign right to choose what agreements they wish to enter into 
with other nations.
109
 The „nemo dat argument‟ does not apply in this case and a precedent for 
creating and conferring enormous powers on an institution can be gathered from the 
establishment of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the UN. Moreover, international crimes affect the 
interests of the international community as a whole. Therefore, the question does not rest on 
individual states‟ interest but the desire to end impunity. Scharf succinctly writes: 
„Suggestion that a state has a right of exclusive jurisdiction over its nationals concerning 
acts committed abroad reflects a colonialist concept that was prevalent in earlier centuries 
but has little relevance to modern practice.‟110 
Interestingly, the US has so far managed to set a precedent through the UNSC Resolution 1593 
(2005) referring the Darfur situation to the ICC that in the absent of consent from the non-party 
state involved or a referral by the UNSC, no investigation or prosecution should be commenced 
in the ICC.
111
 In this resolution, the UNSC decided that nationals of contributing states which are 
non-party to the Rome Statute shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the contributing 
state for acts emanating from their operations in Sudan.
112
 Similarly, in Resolution 1970 (2011) 
referring the situation in Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the ICC, the UNSC included,  at the 
insistence of the United States as a pre-condition to allowing the resolution to pass, a proviso that 
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excludes from the jurisdiction of the Court its citizens as members of an international 
peacekeeping operation.
113
 Therefore, it remains to be seen how the Court will respond. 
4. Complementarity and Admissibility 
Admissibility mainly arises as a result of the fundamental principle of „complementarity‟114 
which is introduced as a general notion by the Preamble and Article 1 of the Statute which 
declare ICC jurisdiction to be complementary to national criminal courts.
115
  
The two provisions thus incorporate into the Statute complementarity as a general goal and a 
constitutional framework upon which basis the Court should function.
116
 Under the 
complementary regime, the Court‟s jurisdiction is subsidiary to municipal courts because it is 
only triggered if there is inaction, unwillingness or inability genuinely to investigate or prosecute 
by the domestic courts.
117
 Therefore, complementarity simply refers to the rules governing the 
relationship between the ICC and domestic courts.
118
 This jurisdiction is the opposite of the 
jurisdictional primacy which the Ad Hoc tribunals enjoy whereby they can assume jurisdiction as 
of right without having to demonstrate any unwillingness or inability on the part of the municipal 
courts.
119
 In this fashion, the ICC fills in the gaps of national criminal jurisdictions, and the two 
systems work together to ensure that impunity is fought on both fronts; national and 
international. 
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It can thus be said that complementarity of jurisdiction is the main feature of the ICC.
120
 That the 
establishment of the ICC does not relieve member states of their responsibility and obligation to 
try and punish those responsible for serious crimes is premised on the fact that municipal 
tribunals constitute forum conveniens where ordinarily both the evidence and suspect will be 
located.
121
  Thus practical considerations of efficiency and effectiveness are given primacy since 
municipal jurisdictions will have the best access to evidence and witnesses. Secondly, the 
drafters resorted to complementary jurisdiction in order to make the project sustainable since 
cases from across the world would overwhelm the Court and impact negatively on its limited 
financial resources.
122
 Third was the intent to motivate domestic jurisdictions to exercise their 
criminal jurisdictions over international crimes.
123
 Lastly, the complementarity regime offered a 
compromise between the need for state sovereignty to prosecute its own nationals without 
external influence on the one hand, and the need for international accountability on the other.
124
  
Complementarity is translated into more specific legal norms in Articles 17 and 20 (3) of the 
Statute which lay down substantial grounds upon which a case would be admissible to the Court. 
Therefore, admissibility criteria implements complementarity.
125
 Complementarity is further 
preserved by provisions in the Statute relating to preliminary rulings on admissibility
126
 and 
challenging the admissibility of a case.
127
 The Court is designated arbiter to assess the 
admissibility of a case.
128
 Thus admissibility of a case may arise for determination in 
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circumstances where the case is being investigated or prosecuted,
129
 the case has been 
investigated and the state has decided not to prosecute the person concerned
130
 or, the person 
concerned has already been tried.
131
 In such instances, a case will be inadmissible, unless the 
state is in reality unwilling or unable „genuinely‟ to carry out the investigation or prosecution.132 
The Prosecutor and the ICC make a determination whether a state is „genuinely unwilling‟ or 
„genuinely unable‟ to investigate or prosecute.133 Similarly, where a person has already been 
tried, a case is admissible if the proceedings in that court were for the purpose of shielding that 
person from his criminal responsibility.
134
 Further, a situation is inadmissible if it lacks sufficient 
gravity or when a prosecution would not be in the interest of justice.
135
 
It is common knowledge that not all member states have adapted their domestic penal laws to the 
ICC Statute. In turn, this presents a challenge to the rule against double jeopardy or the ne bis in 
idem principle which proscribes the punishment of a person by the Court for conduct which falls 
within its subject-matter jurisdiction if that person has already been tried by another court.
136
 
Assuming that an individual has been properly tried by a domestic court for an ordinary crime, 
such as murder, as opposed to genocide or crimes against humanity, strictly speaking, this would 
not be a case of inability or unwillingness to prosecute. Unless it can be demonstrated that the 
proceedings were simply meant to shield the accused from his or her criminal responsibility, 
such a case should be inadmissible before the ICC. Yet such trials tend to trivialise the crime and 
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contribute to revisionism or negationism.
137
 Hence, it has been argued that Article 20 (3) should 
have been couched in a like manner with Article 20 (2) to read, „no person who has been tried by 
another court for a crime referred to in Article 5‟ as opposed to, „no person who has already been 
tried by another court for conduct [...]
138
 However, it can be said that the objective of the ne bis 
in idem principle is to prohibit double jeopardy to all cases in which the perpetrator has been 
genuinely acquitted or convicted by any domestic court.
139
 Similarly, the Statute does not allow 
national courts to try an individual for any of the crimes within its jurisdiction if that person has 
already been tried by the Court.
140
 Therefore, an argument can be made that a person acquitted of 
genocide for failure by the Prosecutor to prove specific intent can still be tried and prosecuted in 
national courts for ordinary homicide without breaching the Statute. 
4.1. „Unwillingness genuinely to investigate or prosecute‟ 
The admissibility criteria provides the most direct basis for allocating responsibility for a 
prosecution between the Court on the one hand, and any other State that may claim jurisdiction 
on the other.
141
 Admissibility criteria therefore establishes a protection mechanism against 
States‟ sovereign right to try and punish violators of international criminal norms and becomes 
akin to the system under human rights bodies requiring a petitioner to exhaust domestic avenues 
before instituting an action for human rights violations in international organisations.
142
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A check on the action undertaken by a state in relation to a particular situation becomes 
inevitable because not every action carried out by the state will satisfy the requirement. 
Accordingly, in Lubanga, PTC – I stated: 
„The Chamber also notes that when a State with jurisdiction over a case is investigating, 
prosecuting or trying it, or has done so, it is not sufficient to declare such a case 
inadmissible. The Chamber observes on the contrary that a declaration of inadmissibility 
is subject to a finding that the relevant State is unwilling or unable to genuinely conduct 
its national proceedings in relation to that case within the meaning of article 17(1)(a) to 
(c), (2) and (3) of the Statute.‟143 
Thus, to block ICC intervention, the national criminal jurisdiction must carry out bona fide 
action demonstrating its „willingness or ability genuinely‟ to carry out investigations or 
prosecutions.
144
 The Court has to establish that the investigation or prosecution being carried out 
by the state in question is „genuine‟ before a deferral can properly be made to or claimed by a 
domestic jurisdiction. In turn, this depends on the circumstances of each particular case.
145
 
Evaluating the genuineness of proceedings practically entails scrutinising the domestic judicial 
proceedings in relation to a particular case as a whole from its inception to the time of 
assessment.
146
  
The Statute provides that unwillingness exists if; the national proceedings are undertaken to 
shield the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
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court,
147
 there has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings
148
 or that the proceedings are not 
conducted independently or impartially, with a view not to bring the person concerned to 
justice.
149
 This safeguard is meant to counter attempts by national criminal tribunals to shield 
those responsible for international crimes.
150
 In the first criterion, the Court has the task of 
examining the motives of the national authorities (executive, judicial or legislative). This 
demands an assessment of the quality of justice and covers procedural and substantive due 
process rights as recognised by international law.
151
 
Hence, national proceedings undertaken in order to make it appear as if investigations or 
prosecutions are underway, including „sham trials‟ to afford the defendant an opportunity to 
subsequently plead the ne bis in idem principle
152
 are without effect.
153
 Such proceedings will 
properly be construed as having been undertaken for the purpose of „shielding the defendant 
from his or her criminal responsibility‟ or that they lacked independence or impartiality.  
4.2. „Inability genuinely to investigate or prosecute‟ 
It has been argued that to a certain extent, „unwillingness‟ relies on a subjective assessment 
whereas „inability‟ involves objective elements.154 As an illustration, a state would be desirous of 
instituting a genuine investigation, prosecution or trial but factually lack the capacity to do so. 
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This may result from, among other things, a civil war or lack of an effective judicial system, like 
in Somalia, Rwanda and Colombia.
155
 The ICC Statute provides: 
„In order to determine inability in a particular case, the Court shall consider whether, due 
to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, the State 
is unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise 
unable to carry out its proceedings.‟156 
It is worth noting that cases of inability are not limited to situations where the state is unable to 
secure the custody of the suspect, or obtain the necessary evidence. The phrase, „or otherwise 
unable to carry out its proceedings‟ serves as a catch-all clause so that all possible factors giving 
rise to inability are as well captured.
157
 Mali is the case in point because the State lacks control 
over Northern Mali which is controlled by the rebels, yet murder and rape, inter alia, are 
endemic. 
The inability to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony must arise from a 
total or substantial collapse or unavailability of the national judicial system.
158
 To satisfy the 
requirement of a total or substantial collapse, it will be sufficient if the collapse has attained an 
intensity affecting a significant or considerable part of the domestic justice system.
159
 According 
to this argument, a degree of intensity paralysing the investigation, prosecution, trial or execution 
of verdicts will suffice.  
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Based on the preceding, it can be argued that developed and well-functioning judicial systems 
which are unable to secure the custody of a defendant would properly avoid ICC prosecutions on 
grounds of complementarity since their national judicial systems have not suffered a total or 
substantial collapse to satisfy the inability requirement as laid down in Article 17 (3) of the 
Statute.
160
 Louise Arbour, an experienced international criminal law expert and Prosecutor of the 
Ad Hoc Tribunals has argued that such a regime is likely to work for the developed countries but 
against developing nations.
161
 Merit is to be found in such an argument bearing in mind that 
„total or substantial collapse of a national judicial system‟, the pre-condition to finding 
„inability‟, will easily be established in countries that are devastated by wars, Africa in particular. 
Contrariwise, the Prosecutor is likely to face insurmountable difficulties to prove „total or 
substantial collapse‟ of national judicial systems for developed countries.  
4.3. Challenging Admissibility 
The complementary regime of the ICC is preserved further by affording States and individuals an 
opportunity to challenge admissibility.
162
 The Statute has mechanisms to ensure that States 
which would exercise jurisdiction themselves over a particular situation are informed of the 
possible ICC proceedings. When the Prosecutor decides to institute proprio motu investigations 
or subsequent to a state party referral, she or he is obligated to inform all states parties and other 
states which would ordinarily exercise jurisdiction over the matter.
163
  
                                                            
160 See Schabas (2004: 86). 
161 See Schabas (2004: 86). 
162 See Newton (2001: 48). 
163 See Art. 18 (1) ICC Statute. 
 
 
 
 
30 
 
Notably, this requirement does not include situations referred to the Prosecutor by the UNSC.
164
 
Some writers have attributed this to the fact that the process leading up to the generation of a 
Chapter VII resolution will give sufficient notice to the concerned state.
165
 The accused or the 
person against whom a subpoena has been issued,
166
 a State with jurisdiction over the matter
167
 
or a State from which acceptance of jurisdiction is required
168
 may challenge the admissibility of 
a case on the grounds set out in Article 17 of the Statute. Similarly, the Court is empowered to 
satisfy itself on its own motion that a case is admissible.
169
 Additionally, the Prosecutor may 
invite the Court to make a ruling on the admissibility of a case.
170
  
4.4. The Court‟s Approach to Complementarity 
Moreno Ocampo, the first Prosecutor of the ICC who recently left office remarked: 
„As a general rule, the policy of the Office of the Prosecutor will be to undertake 
investigations only where there is a clear case of failure to act by the State or States 
concerned [...] The principle of complementarity represents the express will of States 
Parties to create an institution that is global in scope while recognising the primary 
responsibility of States themselves to exercise criminal jurisdiction. The principle is also 
based on considerations of efficiency and effectiveness since States will generally have 
the best access to evidence and witnesses.‟171 
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Indeed this is in line with Newton‟s observation that „the complementarity principle is the 
fulcrum that prioritises the authority of domestic forums to prosecute the crimes defined in 
Article 5 of the Rome Statute.‟172 
The Government of Uganda referred the situation in Northern Uganda to the ICC in December 
2003. Among other things, Uganda stated that it „has not conducted and does not intend to 
conduct national proceedings in relation to the persons most responsible.‟173 The author contends 
that the Ugandan courts did not suffer any collapse in order to satisfy „inability‟ (total or 
substantial collapse or unavailability of a national judicial system) as defined in the Statute.
174
 
Notably, the courts were fully functional and more than able to prosecute the alleged 
offenders.
175
 Moreover, Ugandan courts are among the most enlightened in Africa.
176
 Similarly, 
it cannot be said that the Ugandan Government was „unwilling‟ to investigate and/or prosecute 
the defendants because none of the admissibility requirements for „unwillingness‟177 were 
applicable to the Ugandan situation.
178
 Rather, the Prosecutor and the Government of Uganda 
simply resorted, out of „convenience‟, to hold the trials before the ICC. To argue that the case 
would be admissible on grounds of „inability‟ since the Ugandan national judicial system could 
not secure the custody of the defendants is simply preposterous as the same applies with equal 
magnitude to the ICC.
179
  Therefore, it can be argued that both the Prosecutor and the Court were 
renegades in relation to the complementary requirement. 
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In expressing his discontent over complementarity in the Ugandan self-referral, Schabas aptly 
writes: 
„If the Prosecutor is sincere about his desire to stimulate national systems, he might be 
better to send the case back and give the State in question a lecture about its 
responsibilities in addressing impunity.‟180 
On the other hand, the situation in the DRC comes closer to a classic case of a state whose 
national criminal justice system is „unable‟ to prosecute. As seen earlier, what renders a case 
admissible to the ICC on account of „inability‟ to prosecute is succinctly laid down in the 
Statute.
181
 
In issuing the arrest warrant, the Pre-Trial Chamber wrote: 
„For the purpose of the admissibility analysis [...] the DRC national judicial system has 
undergone certain changes [...] this has resulted inter alia in the issuance of two arrest 
warrants against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo [...] Moreover, as a result of the DRC 
proceedings Thomas Lubanga Dyilo has been held in custody in Kinshasa [...] the 
Prosecution‟s general statement that the DRC national judicial system continues to be 
unable in terms of Article 17 (1) (a-c) and (3) of the Statute does not any longer 
correspond to the reality.‟182 
Simply put, PTC – I conceded that the national judicial system of the DRC did not suffer a „total 
or substantial collapse or unavailability‟ as required by Article 17 (3) of the Statute. In the 
author‟s view, the fact that Lubanga was in detention in the DRC for genocide and crimes 
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against humanity is uncontrovertibly a flagrant manifestation that the national judicial system 
was willing to discharge its international obligations diligently to address impunity.  
However, PTC – I indicated that the national proceedings should involve the same person and 
the same conduct of enlisting and conscripting children under the age of 15 in armed conflict 
which was before the Court.
183
 PTC – I ruled that the DRC was not carrying out proceedings 
against the defendant in relation to the specific charges before the Court. Therefore, admissibility 
criteria had been satisfied. 
Although Moreno Ocampo indicated in a press statement that compelling children to be killers 
puts in danger the future of mankind,
184
 the crimes being addressed by the DRC were of greater 
gravity. The Statute makes no attempt to put crimes on a hierarchy based on gravity and the 
judges at the ICTY have indicated that there is no objective distinction of the crimes based on 
seriousness.
185
 In practice, it is possible to plea bargain, withdraw charges of genocide but 
maintain charges of crimes against humanity.
186
 Similarly, Article 124 of the Statute permits 
States to opt out of jurisdiction for war crimes but not crimes against humanity and genocide.
187
 
Additionally, the Statute is more tolerant of the defence of superior orders and defence of 
property only when war crimes are involved.
188
 On the strength of the preceding, it could be 
argued that indeed there is a hierarchy and that war crimes follow genocide and crimes against 
humanity. 
                                                            
183 See Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest (Prosecutor v Lubanga)   ICC-01/04-
01/06-8). 
184 See Statement by Luis Moreno-Ocampo. 
185 See Judgment (Prosecutor v. Furundžija) ICTY [2000] para. 247. See also Judgment in Sentencing Appeals 
(Prosecutor v. Tadić) [2000] ICTY. 
186 See Schabas „Complementarity in Practice: Some Uncomplimentary Thoughts.‟ 
187 See Schabas „Complementarity in Practice: Some Uncomplimentary Thoughts.‟ 
188 See Schabas „Complementarity in Practice: Some Uncomplimentary Thoughts.‟ 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
The Statute is very clear in the preamble that effective prosecution must be ensured by taking 
measures at the national level and that it is the duty of every state to exercise its criminal 
jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes.
189
 These provisions encourage 
positive complementarity and states to assume their obligations. Moreover, the objective of 
complementarity is to motivate domestic jurisdictions to exercise their criminal jurisdictions over 
international crimes. Even Moreno Ocampo had indicated that the policy of the Office of the 
Prosecutor would be to undertake investigations only where there is a clear case of failure to act 
by the State or States concerned. In the author‟s view, subjecting Thomas Lubanga Dyilo to 
prosecution in the Hague for recruitment of child soldiers as opposed to domestic trial on more 
serious charges of genocide and crimes against humanity was an absolute failure by both the 
Court and the Prosecutor to give effect to the salient provisions of the Statute‟s preamble. Thus, 
the author contends that neither the Ugandan nor the DRC situation has been handled by the ICC 
and the Prosecutor in a manner that is consistent with the Statute‟s complementarity regime 
which aspires to encourage national criminal jurisdictions to discharge their international 
obligations of prosecuting those responsible for international crimes.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
In this Chapter, the author makes an assessment of the UNSC referral mechanism and the 
complementary requirement of the Statute. 
1. General Introduction to UNSC Trigger Mechanism 
As seen earlier, the jurisdiction of the ICC sprouts from consent of Party States.
190
 However, an 
exception is to be found in situations referred to the Prosecutor by the UNSC in the exercise of 
Chapter VII powers under the Charter
191
 pursuant to which it can determine the existence of a 
threat to the peace, breach of the peace or an act of aggression.
192
 When the UNSC makes such a 
determination, it is empowered to take measures aimed at restoring or maintaining international 
peace and security
193
 and UN Member States are obligated to accept and carry out the 
decisions.
194
 The powers of the UNSC are coercive and mandatory in that UN Member States are 
under an obligation to cooperate not only with the UNSC but also inter se to implement its 
decisions.
195
 
In this regard, the UNSC may make a Chapter VII resolution to refer the situation to the 
Prosecutor of the ICC.
196
 In such a case, the Court does not need to satisfy itself of the 
jurisdictional prerequisites that the crime was committed on the territory of a party state or by a 
national of a party state or on the territory or by a national of a non-party state that consents ad 
hoc to ICC jurisdiction.
197
 The jurisdictional reach of the ICC is thereby extended beyond the 
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territory of member states of the ICC and the nationality of the perpetrator to the whole world.
198
 
Seen from such a perspective and in such instances, some have argued that the Court would be 
exercising „universal jurisdiction‟ in so far as the territoriality and personality principles become 
irrelevant in determining the Court‟s jurisdictional reach.199 
It must be noted at the outset that the UNSC refers to the Prosecutor a „situation‟ as opposed to a 
„case.‟200 This was motivated by reasons not to give the Prosecutor over-broad powers because a 
case is much more narrowly defined in terms of the specific offence(s) and the alleged 
perpetrator(s). Otherwise, the Prosecutor could easily proceed to investigate the crime(s) and/or 
person(s) named in the „case‟. The safeguard is also reflected in Article 15 of the Statute 
whereby the Prosecutor cannot institute proprio motu investigations without obtaining PTC 
authorisation. In turn, this prevents the politicisation of the referral procedure through the 
targeting of pre-selected individuals or of the parties to a particular side of a conflict while at the 
same time limiting the UNSC‟s competence in this area.201 This does not in any way suggest a 
limitation on the UNSC‟s ability to decide under the Charter that a particular „case‟ should be 
referred to the Court. Rather, that such a decision would not be binding on the Court.
202
 
Therefore, the ICC Statute merely recognises and acknowledges the primacy accorded to the 
UNSC by the Charter to maintain and restore international peace and security.
203
 As of October 
2012, two situations occurring on the territories of non-party states had been referred to the 
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Prosecutor by the UNSC.
204
 Darfur (Sudan) was the first situation to be referred to the Prosecutor 
in 2005
205
 followed by the referral of the situation in Libya in 2011.
206
  
Having given a background to the mechanism behind UNSC referrals, it becomes imperative to 
consider how complementarity, which is given effect through the admissibility criteria, comes 
into play. On the one hand, the United Nations was principally created to maintain and restore 
international peace and security, the domain of the UNSC.
207
 On the other hand, crimes under the 
jurisdiction of the Court are a threat to international peace and security.
208
 In this fashion, the 
express purpose of the Statute overlaps the goals of the UN. 
When the UN was created, Member States conferred on the UNSC the primary responsibility to 
maintain international peace and security and they agreed that the UNSC shall act on their 
behalf.
209
 Member States are therefore duty bound to accept and carry out the decisions of the 
UNSC. Consequently, an argument has been made that a UNSC referral of a situation to the 
Prosecutor nullifies and overrides a state‟s inherent national judicial authority to try and punish 
international crimes.
210
 Going by this argument, a UNSC referral dispenses with the 
complementarity requirement by vesting jurisdictional primacy on the Court similar to that 
enjoyed by the Ad Hoc tribunals. 
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2. Complementarity in UNSC Referred Situations  
For self-referred and proprio motu investigations, the Statute provides in explicit terms that the 
admissibility criteria shall apply.
211
 However, when the UNSC makes a referral, the issue is 
unclear.
212
 Article 17 of the Statute (Issues of admissibility) does not distinguish between the 
triggering mechanisms but neither does the context suggest that the criteria should not apply.
213
  
Although there are no direct provisions in the Statute upon which to determine this question, an 
inference can still be drawn that admissibility criteria apply to UNSC referrals. To begin with, 
Article 17 (1) makes reference to preambular paragraph 10 and Article 1 of the Statute, which 
both generally declare that the Court shall be complementary to national jurisdictions. It can 
therefore be said that the Statute envisages the application of complementarity in all matters 
referred to the Prosecutor. Further, the Statute gives the Court discretion to determine on its own 
motion the admissibility of a case in line with Article 17.
214
 Furthermore, in initiating an 
investigation, the Prosecutor is obligated to consider whether the case would be admissible under 
Article 17 of the Statute.
215
 Having received the Darfur situation as referred by the UNSC, the 
Prosecutor announced that he was required under the Statute to assess and factor-in admissibility 
before starting an investigation.
216
 Accordingly, should the Prosecutor decide that there is not a 
sufficient basis upon which to prosecute owing to the inadmissibility of a case under Article 17 
of the Statute, she or he is duty bound to inform PTC and the party making the referral (a state or 
the UNSC).
217
 In turn, if the situation was referred to the Prosecutor by the UNSC, the latter can 
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request PTC to review the Prosecutor‟s decision not to proceed.218 It then becomes clear that 
admissibility criteria will apply whether the situation has been referred by the UNSC or a State. 
This submission finds further support in the fact that it was never suggested at the ILC, Ad Hoc 
Committee or PrepCom during the negotiation process of the Statute that admissibility criteria 
should not apply to UNSC referred situations.
219
 
Contrariwise, Article 18 (Preliminary rulings regarding admissibility) of the Statute only applies 
to self-referrals and proprio motu investigations. However, this does not mean inapplicability of 
admissibility criteria. Rather, it merely entails that a party cannot seek a preliminary ruling on 
admissibility when a matter has been referred to the Prosecutor by the UNSC.
220
 Thus, whereas 
Article 18 on preliminary challenges to admissibility does not apply to UNSC referrals, the same 
cannot be said about Article 19.
221
 Article 19 (Challenges to the jurisdiction of the Court or 
admissibility of a case) just like Article 17 does not distinguish between triggering mechanisms. 
Admittedly, Article 19 does not only empower the Court with discretion to determine 
admissibility of a case on its own motion but also enables a state with jurisdiction over a case or 
the defendant to challenge admissibility. Further, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence obligate 
the Registrar of the Court to inform „those‟ who have referred a situation of any challenge to 
admissibility that has arisen pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute.
222
 Therefore, it can be 
argued that if the admissibility criteria were meant to be inapplicable to situations referred to the 
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Prosecutor by the UNSC, the Rule should have read „the state‟ as opposed to „those‟ since only a 
state and the UNSC may refer a situation.
223
  
On the strength of the preceding, it can plausibly be argued that the UNSC may only participate 
in the ICC on a complementary basis or forgo an ICC referral to assert its jurisdictional primacy 
in ad hoc tribunals.
224
 Thus, the ostensible tenor of the Statute preserves complementarity even in 
UNSC referred situations to the Prosecutor. This is buttressed by the informal expert paper from 
the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) which stated that the Prosecutor may have to assess 
admissibility in a situation referred by the UNSC.
225
 Arsanjani comes to the same conclusion and 
notes: 
„The result may not be fully consistent with the original intention of empowering the 
Security Council with the right of referral which was to avoid the creation of ad hoc 
tribunals.‟226 
To date, the UNSC is the most powerful institution globally in matters pertaining to international 
peace and security. This is evident from the enormous powers vested in it by the Charter. As 
such, the independence and impartiality of the Court is seriously questioned in matters involving 
the UNSC. 
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Fletcher and Ohlin have thus stated: 
„The pursuit of international justice sometimes depends as much on matters of 
administration as it does on questions of law, and how these matters of administration are 
treated by the Rome Statute reveals deeper conceptual uncertainties [...] the Court 
functions differently when it hears cases referred by the Security Council.‟227 
The unique involvement of the UNSC in international peace and security matters can be 
illustrated by the non-applicability of the territoriality and personality jurisdictional requirements 
of the Statute to situations referred to the Prosecutor by the UNSC.
228
 This may go to suggest 
that matters emanating from a UNSC referral are placed on a different judicial track.
229
 Further, 
in cases referred by a state party or when conducting proprio motu investigations, the Court‟s 
funding is assessed from contributions made by States Parties whereas in the case of a UNSC 
referral funding comes directly from the UN.
230
 Based on this statutory provision, it can be 
argued that in the former the ICC is an independent Court presiding over international crimes 
whereas in the latter the ICC becomes an organ of the UN called upon to advance the UNSC‟s 
objectives of international peace and security.
231
 In its resolution to refer the Darfur situation to 
the Prosecutor, the UNSC resolved that no UN funds should be used to facilitate the 
prosecutions.
232
 Similarly, in Resolution 1970 (2011) to refer the situation in Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya to the ICC, the UNSC decided that none of the expenses for the referral, investigation 
or prosecution would be borne by the UN.
233
 These decisions by the UNSC were a total 
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disregard of the Statute
234
 and undermine arguments one would make that the Court is truly 
independent and impartial in matters involving the UNSC. In the author‟s view, this questionable 
independence and impartiality of the Court in its dealings with the UNSC casts a doubt on the 
practicality of applying the admissibility criteria in matters referred to the Prosecutor by the 
UNSC. Particularly, one of the grounds upon which the Court can render a case inadmissible is 
the „lack of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court.‟235 Similarly, the Prosecutor 
may, subject to informing the PTC and the party making a referral, decide not to institute an 
investigation on account of insufficient gravity for a prosecution.
236
 In these two scenarios, it 
remains highly doubtful and questionable if either the Court or the Prosecutor would decide that 
a UNSC referral lacks sufficient gravity. By referring a situation to the Court, the UNSC is 
satisfied that the situation is sufficiently grave to threaten international peace and security.
237
 In 
such a case, the Court, just like the Ad Hoc tribunals, is called upon by the UNSC to exercise the 
highest goal of the Charter and international law. Inevitably, this creates a nexus between the 
juridical mandate of the Court on the one hand and the peace and security responsibilities of the 
UNSC on the other hand. In such cases, it becomes flagrantly unfathomable for the Prosecutor or 
even the Court to hold a UNSC referral inadmissible
238
 thereby leaving the UNSC with the 
option, inter alia, to establish the costly ad hoc tribunals, a trend the UNSC is endeavouring to 
avoid.
239
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In commenting on PTC‟s ambivalence to judicially review admissibility let alone the „gravity 
test‟ in the case of Ahmad Harun and Ali Kushayb (Darfur situation) referred to the Prosecutor 
by the UNSC in April 2007,
240
 Bergsmo notes: 
„This relatively cursory review of admissibility may be partially explained by the fact that 
the situation was referred by the Security Council, even though a Security Council 
referral itself may not pose any legal constraints on the ICC.‟241 
The preceding raise some doubt on the practicality of applying complementarity in situations 
referred to the Prosecutor by the UNSC. During the Rome Statute negotiations, India‟s Head of 
Delegation objected to allowing the UNSC to refer a matter to the Court.
242
 India contended that 
the UNSC established ad hoc tribunals because no judicial mechanism existed then to try the 
crimes committed in Yugoslavia and Rwanda. But with the establishment of the ICC, fora exist 
to which party states could refer matters, unless the UNSC‟s referral would be more binding on 
the Court, the mechanism was unnecessary.
243
  
To date, the UNSC remains the most powerful and highest-ranking rule-making authority in the 
Post WW II international legal order.
244
 It can order a referral, at the same time refuse to pay for 
it thus snubbing its nose at the provisions of the Statute. In the author‟s view, pragmatism 
renders it highly unlikely that the Court would uniformly apply the admissibility criteria in 
UNSC referred situations.  
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3. UNSC Resolution Determining Admissibility 
A further question presupposes that a UNSC resolution to refer a matter to the Prosecutor 
declared that the concerned state is unwilling or unable genuinely to investigate or prosecute.
245
 
Resolution 1970 (2011) comes close to the case in point when it „considers that the widespread 
and systematic attacks currently taking place in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya against the civilian 
population may amount to crimes against humanity.‟246 In the author‟s view, „widespread‟ and 
„systematic‟ as definitional elements for Crimes against Humanity247 are findings of fact to be 
made by the Court. This is one of the elements which, if proved by the Prosecution, would 
enable the Court to find that the attacks on the civilian population in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
amounted to Crimes against Humanity.
248
 The Resolution‟s potential to perilously drift towards 
usurping the Court‟s responsibility to find and establish facts is thus imminent.   
As seen earlier, a UNSC referral does not ipso facto render the admissibility requirement 
inapplicable. However, the question cannot be determined by exclusive reference to the Statute 
because the Preamble reaffirms the Charter‟s purposes and principles.249 It is uncontroverted that 
the ICC Statute envisages an independent and impartial organisation.
250
 However, it remains 
highly questionable if, practically, this independence and impartiality would preclude external 
influence from other bodies such as the UNSC. The author contends that the ICC would not be 
bound because the relevant provisions of the Charter (Articles 24, 25 and 103) address UN 
                                                            
245 See Benzing (2003: 626). 
246 See Resolution 1970 (2011). 
247 See Art. 7 (1) ICC Statute. 
248 See Prosecutor v Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui (Pre-Trial Chamber) ICC, decision of 30 September 2008, paras. 
395-97. 
249 See Preambular paragraph 7 ICC Statute. 
250 See Arts. 40 and 42 ICC Statute. 
 
 
 
 
45 
 
Member States in contradistinction to international organisations.
251
 Moreover, the Charter does 
not provide, expressly or by implication that a UNSC resolution has a binding effect on 
international organisations.
252
 Similarly, the Statute does not provide that UNSC resolutions are 
binding on the Court except in cases of a request for a deferral of an investigation.
253
 Therefore, 
the Court would not be bound. Thus, the Statute expressly states that the functioning and 
jurisdiction of the ICC are to be governed by the Statute.
254
 
However, one is still tempted to argue that states cannot circumvent the binding effect of a 
resolution by creating an organisation that may not be so bound. To this question, the author 
takes the view that unless the creation of the ICC by UN member states amounted to 
circumventing duties imposed on them by the UNSC, circumvention does not come into 
picture.
255
 Moreover, there is nothing in the Statute or the Rules of Evidence and Procedure to 
suggest that such a resolution by the UNSC would be binding on the Court.
256
 Apart from that, 
the Court is designated arbiter on admissibility.
257
 Therefore, the resolution of the UNSC 
determining admissibility of a situation would lack binding effect on the Court.
258
 
Contrariwise, others have contended that Chapter VII decisions of the UNSC are equally binding 
on international organisations in so far as they are established by UN Member States
259
 because 
states cannot confer an international organisation with more powers than they have.
260
 Therefore, 
states cannot circumvent their obligations under the Charter by creating an international 
                                                            
251 See Arsanjani (1999: 22). 
252 See Arsanjani (1999: 22-25) 
253 See Art. 16 ICC Statute. 
254 See Art. 1 ICC Statute. See also Doria, Gasser and Bassiouni (2009: 458). 
255 See Stigen (2008: 242). 
256 See Doria, Gasser and Bassiouni (2009: 463). 
257 See Art. 19 (1) ICC Statute. 
258 See Art. 19 (1) ICC Statute.  
259 See Benzing (2003: 627). 
260 See Wet (2000: 181-94). 
 
 
 
 
46 
 
organisation that performs its obligations in breach of the UN and its organs.
261
 To begin with, it 
is reasonable to observe that the UNSC may only „utilise‟ an international organisation by way 
of Chapter VII resolutions within the framework set by the treaty establishing that 
organisation.
262
 If this argument holds, it follows that the UNSC may not ignore the 
complementary nature of the Court‟s legal framework.263 Further, the nemo dat quod non habet 
argument cannot stand because in creating the UN (arguably, the Nuremberg Tribunal too), 
states created institutions with powers they did not have.
264
 
As to the binding effect of such a resolution on states, it can be said that UN member states have 
agreed to accept and carry out the decisions of the UNSC.
265
 Further, where UN members are 
faced with an obligation under international agreement that conflicts the obligations under the 
Charter, the latter takes precedence.
266
 Thus, States would be bound by such a resolution. 
Accordingly, whereas UN member states would be bound, the same cannot be said about the 
Court. However, the ICC‟s admissibility findings relate to specific individual cases whereas the 
UNSC findings would relate to entire situations. In the end, findings on entire situations become 
irrelevant as more specific cases emerge. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
In this Chapter, the author assesses complementarity in situations that are self-referred to the 
ICC. Whereas the Statute recalls that it is the duty of Member States to exercise their criminal 
jurisdictions over perpetrators of international crimes,
267
 self-referring states „seem‟ to abdicate 
this duty by claiming inability. 
1. Basis of Duty to Prosecute 
The affirmation of complementarity in the Statute implies that the primary responsibility to 
repress serious crimes of international concern falls on domestic criminal tribunals.
268
 This duty 
is connected to the responsibility that each state has vis-à-vis the other states in maintaining 
fundamental values of international concern by asserting jurisdiction over crimes committed on 
its territory.
269
 Therefore, it is derived from customary international law. For that reason, third 
states merely have authority to investigate and prosecute international crimes.
270
 However, in so 
far as it relates to grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, the Contracting Parties are under 
an obligation to prosecute or extradite the perpetrator irrespective of where, by whom or against 
whom the offence was committed.
271
 Thus, by „recalling‟ that it is the duty of States to exercise 
their criminal jurisdictions, the Statute acknowledges a pre-existing obligation to investigate and 
prosecute.
272
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The Preamble refers to „the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those 
responsible for international crimes.‟273 Thus, the duty is not restricted to „the most serious 
crimes of international concern‟ only, but „international crimes‟ the category of which is broader 
than the former. The phraseology denotes an obligatory rather that a voluntary role of domestic 
criminal jurisdictions in investigating and prosecuting international crimes. Further, the Statute 
„affirm[s] that the most serious crimes of concern to the international community must not go 
unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the 
national level and by enhancing international cooperation.‟274 This too suggests a mandatory 
obligation on States Parties. It then becomes a logical imperative to assess the legal significance 
of the said provisions. 
2. Legal force of the Preamble 
It is generally understood that the legal force of a Preamble rests in the interpretative standpoint 
for the operative provisions.
275
 Thus, the mandatory role of States Parties in the investigation and 
prosecution of international crimes must underlie the interpretation of the operative provisions of 
the Statute. In this regard, central are those provisions that set forth the admissibility criteria. 
However, there is nothing in the law of treaties indicating that preambular provisions have an 
inferior legal force or no legal force at all, by virtue of the fact alone that they are set forth in the 
Preamble rather than the dispositif.
276
 Thus a Preambular provision can be just as binding as a 
provision in the operative part. However, its normativity is a matter of degree,
277
 mainly 
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determined by the precision and clarity of its content and the regime for enforcement.
278
 
Generally, preambular provisions will lack these tenets and therefore hold a low degree of 
normative force or lack it completely. Thus the absence of normative force does not result from 
its formal place in the preamble. In the final analysis, preambular normativity will depend on the 
individual provision in question. 
Therefore, there is no logic to deny or give the Statute‟s preambular provisions lesser 
normativity than the Article 1 proclamation in the Genocide Convention, 1948.
279
 This is 
particularly so with preambular paragraph six of the Statute which recalls that it is the duty of 
States Parties to invoke their criminal jurisdictions over those who commit international 
crimes.
280
 By referring to „duty‟, the Preamble makes it clear as to what exactly is expected of 
States as they respond to international crimes; they must exercise their criminal jurisdiction. It 
may be argued though that this duty is political or moral in nature as opposed to being legal. 
However, a thorough review of the Statute reveals that „duty‟ has been used in a legal sense 
elsewhere in the Statute.
281
 To this end, the assumption that identical terms in a treaty have an 
identical meaning
282
 would suggest that „duty‟ as referred to in the Preamble is legal in nature as 
opposed to merely being moral or political. This position is fortified by the maxim of treaty 
interpretation that, in principle, a treaty must be interpreted as consistent with existing law and 
not in violation of it.
283
 In the present context, such an interpretation is in conformity with the 
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duty to investigate and prosecute which precedes the Statute and remains applicable independent 
of it. 
3. General Introduction to Self-Referral Trigger Mechanism 
In terms of jurisdiction, the Court has power to hear cases where, inter alia, a situation in which 
it appears that one or – more crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court have been committed is 
referred to the Prosecutor by a State Party.
284
 When a State refers to the Prosecutor for 
investigation a situation that has occurred on its territory or where it‟s national is the 
perpetrator,
285
 the action appears to conflict the State‟s duty to investigate, prosecute, convict and 
punish the perpetrator as envisioned by the Statute. Currently, four States Parties; Uganda, the 
DRC, the Central African Republic and Mali have referred situations occurring on their own 
territories to the Court, hence the term „self-referral.‟286 
4. Self-Referral v Duty to Prosecute  
As already seen, the Statute recognises States‟ duty to exercise their criminal jurisdictions in 
repressing international crimes. However, States Parties appear to abdicate this duty when they 
refer to the Prosecutor for investigation a situation over which they have direct jurisdiction. It has 
been argued that it is doubtful if territorial States would discharge this duty by referring a 
situation to the ICC and contending that they are ensuring that ICC crimes are investigated and 
prosecuted, albeit by the ICC rather than their own courts.
287
 This argument is based on the 
premise that the unambiguously plain terms of preambular paragraph six contradict its extension 
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to cover the exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC.
288
 Proponents of this construction go further to 
argue that even if a broader interpretation of preambular paragraph six were allowed, the State 
Party making the referral cannot guarantee that the ICC will invoke its jurisdiction. This could be 
the case where the referred situation lacks sufficient gravity
289
 or that an investigation or 
prosecution would not be in the interest of justice.
290
 Simply put, it is unconvincing to regard the 
exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC in this regard as a fulfillment of the State‟s obligation to 
investigate and prosecute. 
In addressing this apparent inconsistency, Kress notes: 
„It would be too rigorous a reading of the words “exercise its criminal jurisdiction” within 
the sixth preambular paragraph to construe them to mean investigate, prosecute and, 
eventually, punish at the national level. In light of the overarching goal of the ICC Statute 
to end impunity, the territorial state should not be prevented from choosing a second 
option against impunity, namely to refer a situation to the ICC with a view to 
international investigation.‟291 
This entails that a territorial state‟s duty to exercise its criminal jurisdiction should be understood 
in a broader sense as the obligation to ensure that a genuine investigation is undertaken either by 
the State itself or by way of extradition to another State or even by way of surrender to the ICC. 
Such an interpretation is consistent with the spirit of the Statute.
292
 Moreover, treaty law 
interpretation require terms in a treaty to be given their ordinary meaning in their context and in 
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the light of its object and purpose
293
 – in this case, ending impunity. Thus, where a State Party is 
unable or unwilling genuinely to investigate or prosecute, there is no logic in rejecting that 
State‟s relinquishment of jurisdiction in favour of the Court especially if the situation satisfies 
the „sufficient gravity‟ test.294 If such were the case, there would be a looming possibility that the 
situation would not be dealt with at both fora thereby leading to injustice and impunity. A Swiss 
Delegate to the Rome Conference remarked, „the goal of the Conference was to establish a 
permanent international court to punish [...] whenever national courts could not or would not 
perform their duty.‟295 Therefore, the duty imposed under preambular paragraph six should be 
interpreted from this angle. By declining to exercise jurisdiction in favour of the ICC, the step is 
taken to enhance the delivery of effective justice. In turn, this is consistent not only with the 
letter but also the spirit of the Statute and other international instruments in relation to the core 
crimes. Such a construction is in accord with preambular paragraph four which requires States to 
take positive action to ensure that crimes within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court do 
not go unpunished. This of course is, and should be distinguishable from failure or refusal to 
prosecute emanating from apathy or a desire to shield perpetrators which may rightly be 
criticised as an affront to the fight against impunity.  
Having established that States have a duty to exercise their criminal jurisdiction over those 
responsible for international crimes and that a self-referred situation to the Court is consistent 
with this duty, one is left to wonder whether such a referral amounts to a waiver of 
complementarity. On the one hand, the general assumption is that complementarity will avail 
States a pre-emptive measure against the Court‟s action either by instituting proceedings in their 
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domestic criminal courts, by later on asking for a deferral
296
 or by challenging admissibility.
297
 
On the other hand, self-referrals begin from the opposite assumption; the State making such a 
referral wants the Court to adjudicate thereby not demonstrating willingness or ability to 
investigate and prosecute.
298
 This has raised an argument that self-referrals have the operational 
effect of waiving complementarity.
299
 
5. Self-Referrals and Waivers 
Waiver of complementarity has two dimensions – that the referring State does not contest 
admissibility or that it has renounced its jurisdiction in favour of the Court thereby waiving its 
primacy over the situation.
300
 However, both interpretations of waiver have the same 
implications. 
It is generally understood that waivers or renunciations of claims of rights of states must either 
be express or unequivocally implied from the conduct of the state alleged to have waived or 
renounced its right.
301
 In the case of self-referrals, the lack of an express statement to that effect 
casts a doubt on the imputation of an unequivocal implied waiver by the mere fact of a self-
referral alone.
302
 Notably, a self-referral, just like any other referral, involves a „situation‟ as 
opposed to a specific „case‟. Therefore, a self-referring state cannot guarantee that the persons or 
offences named in the referral will indeed be the only ones that the Court will sustain. This is 
aptly illustrated by the Ugandan self-referral which sought to limit the investigation to the 
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organised armed group (the Lord‟s Resistance Army).303 Moreover, even if the self-referring 
state made an express indication to waive the right to challenge admissibility, complementarity 
should still be applicable for a number of reasons. 
First, complementarity is intended to function as a catalyst for states to investigate and prosecute 
international crimes.
304
 Complementarity thus seeks to improve States‟ performance of their duty 
in the repression of international crimes which could be grossly undermined if self-referrals had 
the operational effect of waiving complementarity. This would promote impunity at the national 
level because self-referring states would be presented with a convenient opportunity not to 
investigate and prosecute international crimes even in the absence of inability or unwillingness. 
Secondly, treating self-referrals as waivers of complementarity is incompatible with a State‟s 
duty to utilise its domestic criminal jurisdiction for the repression of international crimes. 
Therefore, the preambular duty lays down the foundation for complementarity which in turn 
triggers the Court‟s jurisdiction when domestic criminal jurisdictions are unable or unwilling 
genuinely to discharge that duty. Further, subjecting self-referred situations to the admissibility 
requirement diminishes the risk of politicisation of the Court. On this score, it has been averred 
that the self-referral by the DRC was an attempt by the President to sideline his political 
opponents in the run-up to the 2006 elections.
305
 Having a mechanism by which cases are 
declared inadmissible contributes to thwarting attempts to selectively externalise the adjudication 
of cases which are politically or otherwise inconvenient to investigate and prosecute 
domestically. Apart from that, in the absence of internationalised courts and third States‟ claim 
of jurisdiction, the Court would be overwhelmed with cases as it would be the only forum for 
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bringing perpetrators to justice. This would inundate the Court with cases and burst its modest 
resources.
306
 If such were the case, the Court would be divested of a tool to decline the exercise 
of its jurisdiction because cases can adequately be dealt with at the national level. Further, the 
admissibility criteria takes into account sovereign concerns as well as those of the individual(s) 
involved which, in turn, promotes cooperation.
307
  
The preceding buttresses the view that self-referrals are subject to the complementarity regime in 
principle. Accordingly, the Court found the Thomas Lubanga Dyilo case admissible since no 
State with jurisdiction over the case was acting. This suggests a contrario that the Court would 
have assessed unwillingness and inability if a State with jurisdiction over the matter had acted 
vis-à-vis the same person and the same conduct.  
6. Self-Referrals and the Procedural Framework for Complementarity 
When a situation has been self-referred to the Prosecutor, he or she has to determine its 
admissibility for the purpose of instituting investigations.
308
 This requirement on the part of the 
Prosecutor is mandatory rather than permissive. The assessment by the prosecutor is not 
dependent on the self-referring state‟s own perception as to the admissibility of the case.309 If the 
Prosecutor determines that there is a reasonable basis upon which to institute an investigation, he 
is still obligated to notify all States Parties and those States which would normally exercise 
jurisdiction over the matter.
310
 It must be mentioned that there is nothing legally or procedurally 
that restrains a State that has made a referral from raising a preliminary challenge to the 
admissibility of a case. If the self-referring State makes a preliminary challenge to the 
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admissibility of a case, it can only raise another admissibility challenge in the substantive 
proceedings if there is a significant change of circumstances or on grounds of additional 
significant facts.
311
 
Further, in terms of the right to challenge admissibility as envisioned by the Statute, treating self-
referrals as waivers of complementarity has a direct impact on the right of an accused or the 
person against whom an arrest warrant or summons to appear has been issued.
312
 There is an 
argument that such an individual‟s claim to challenge admissibility may be „waived‟ by the 
referring state.
313
 A further argument claims that an individual‟s challenge of admissibility based 
on the referring State‟s ability or willingness to investigate and prosecute314 as opposed to a 
challenge based on the ne bis in idem principle
315
 is not tantamount to an individual‟s right. 
Rather, it only confers an individual „standing to raise an issue that pertains to state 
sovereignty.‟316 By this view, challenging the admissibility of a case is conceived as a 
mechanism meant to protect the right of States to exercise their domestic criminal jurisdiction 
over international crimes. Therefore, an individual cannot claim a right that has been waived by 
the referring State.
317
 
Such an argument is incompatible with the fundamentality attached to complementarity that 
domestic criminal jurisdictions are under an obligation to investigate and prosecute international 
crimes. Therefore, the issue at all material times is whether or not the self-referring state is 
complying with that duty rather than whether it is in its interest not to invoke the right to exercise 
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its jurisdiction.
318
 As earlier seen, such an obligation cannot be waived.
319
 Therefore, an accused 
or a person for whom an arrest warrant or a summons to appear has been issued could claim that 
the self-referring State is active, willing or able to investigate and prosecute.  
The cases of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and Mathew Ngudjolo Chui arising from the DRC‟s self-
referral cast light on the foregoing in so far as the Court did not treat the self-referral as a waiver 
of complementarity. In the Lubanga case, inter alia, PTC – I noted:  
„For the purpose of the admissibility analysis of the case against Mr Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo, the Chamber observes that since March 2004 the DRC national judicial system has 
undergone certain changes […] Therefore, in the Chamber‟s view, the Prosecution‟s 
general statement that the DRC national judicial system continues to be unable in the 
sense of article 17 (1) (a) to (c) and (3), of the Statute does not wholly correspond to the 
reality any longer.‟320 
This reasoning suggests that the Court was theoretically willing to find the case inadmissible if 
certain action had been taken by the DRC. More recently, in issuing an arrest warrant against 
Mathew Ngudjolo Chui, PTC – I stated that it was ready to find the case admissible without 
prejudicing the filing of a challenge to the admissibility of a case and any subsequent decision in 
that regard.
321
 These cases illustrate that despite the situation having been self-referred by the 
DRC, the Court did not anticipate any impediment to future admissibility challenges either at the 
instance of the self-referring state or other parties envisioned by the Statute. Therefore, the 
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foregoing discussion demonstrates that a matter that is self-referred to the ICC does not waive 
the complementarity regime of the Statute.  
7. State Withdrawal of a Self-Referred Situation 
This discussion is based on the Ugandan officials‟ statements expressing the intention to 
withdraw the self-referral made to the ICC in 2003.
322
 The threat itself was reiterated several 
times by the Government.
323
 Notably, the question of withdrawing a self-referral has not been 
officially brought up before the Court yet, but raises the possibility. In this context, withdrawal is 
used in its literal sense; taking back or retreating from the referral made by a State Party. At the 
outset, it must be mentioned that „withdrawal‟ in the current context is not provided for in the 
Statute, the Rules or Regulations of the Court.
324
 Therefore, a review of the applicable law to the 
Court offers an alternative.
325
 
An important beginning point is the observation made by the ICJ that the state of international 
practice is such that one cannot infer from the absence of an Article that allows the entry of 
reservations in a multilateral treaty that contracting parties are thereby restrained from entering 
into certain reservations. Rather, factors such as the character of a multilateral Convention, its 
purpose, provisions, mode of preparation and adoption should be considered.
326
 Similarly, an 
inference cannot be drawn from the absence of an article providing for withdrawal of self-
referrals or ad hoc declarations that the act is prohibited by the Statute. The mere absence by 
itself is an insufficient basis for a definitive assessment. This is in tune with the VCLT which 
provides that lack of a provision concerning withdrawal from a treaty does not bar such an act if 
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it is established that the parties intended to admit the possibility of withdrawal, or a right of 
withdrawal may be implied by the nature of the treaty.
327
 However, even if this Article may 
relate to situations of withdrawal from an entire treaty containing no provision to that effect, 
rather than withdrawal from a particular provision in that treaty, the current question can still be 
answered by way of analogy.
328
 Resort to the preamble in which the „spirit of a Statute lies‟ is 
particularly highlighting to ascertain the nature and purpose of the ICC Statute. The Preamble 
read in conjunction with Article 1 reveal that the Statute was mainly created to punish the most 
serious crimes concerning the international community and to put an end to impunity for the 
perpetrators of such crimes. In multilateral treaties of such special type and nature, the ICJ has 
stated that: 
„The Contracting States do not have any interests of their own; they merely have, one and 
all, a common interest, namely, the accomplishment of those high purposes which are the 
raison d‟être of the Convention. Consequently, in a Convention of this type one cannot 
speak of individual advantages or disadvantages to States.‟329 
To mirror withdrawal of a referral in the manner suggested by the Ugandan Government against 
the foregoing reveals that such a decision would defeat the common interest of the international 
community and conflict the nature and purpose of the ICC Statute. Moreover, even the Statute 
only provides for the withdrawal from the treaty.
330
 This is consistent with the VCLT in so far as 
it provides that the right of a party to withdraw from a treaty may be exercised only with respect 
to the whole treaty unless the treaty otherwise provides or the parties otherwise agree.
331
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Moreover, the international law doctrine of pacta sunt servanda requires that treaties must be 
performed in good faith.
332
 Thus the Ugandan Government would have been estopped from 
withdrawing the referral. 
Likewise, the effect of withdrawing from the ICC Statute is such that the withdrawing State is 
not absolved of the obligations arising under the Statute while it was a Party. Neither would it 
affect the cooperation requirement with the Court in relation to criminal investigations and 
proceedings commenced prior to the effective date of the withdrawal. Similarly, the withdrawal 
would not prejudice the continued consideration of any matter which was already under 
consideration by the Court before the effective date of the withdrawal.
333
 Thus, it is not only 
impossible to withdraw a self-referred situation to the ICC but also to terminate the obligations 
accruing before the effective date of the withdrawal. Therefore, the Uganda Government could 
not have withdrawn the self-referred situation to the Court. It could only withdraw from the 
treaty without severing the already attaching obligations thereby rendering the withdrawal 
illogical and merely academic.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
1. Conclusion 
Complementarity is such a fundamental principle that on the one hand, it protects and upholds 
state sovereignty while affording the Court jurisdiction to adjudicate on international crimes on 
the other hand. It achieves this by conferring on states parties the primary duty to investigate, 
prosecute and punish perpetrators of international crimes. At the same time, a state‟s inaction, 
inability or unwillingness to exercise this primary duty triggers the Court‟s jurisdiction. This 
way, complementarity strikes a balance between the national interest in states‟ maintenance of 
their sovereignty over criminal matters where they have a jurisdictional link and the interest of 
the international community in repressing international crimes. Complementarity as a concept is 
transformed into a legal framework through the admissibility criteria for which the statutory 
procedural set-up reveals that regardless of the triggering mechanism, the admissibility 
requirement applies. Thus, complementarity is a bed-rock upon which the Statute is founded. 
However, challenges arise when the UNSC has adopted a Chapter VII resolution under the 
Charter to refer a situation to the Prosecutor.  The UNSC‟s influential position makes it unlikely 
that the Court or the Prosecutor would uniformly apply the admissibility requirement. 
Further, complementarity is so fundamental that treating self-referrals as waivers of 
complementarity would be a complete reversal of this important tenet. Moreover, the self-
referred cases that have traversed the Court so far have upheld the complementarity regime. 
Consequently, it can affirmatively be stated that self-referrals do not and should not have the 
operational effect of waivers.  
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On the question of withdrawing a self-referred situation to the ICC, it can be said that there is no 
provision for that recourse in the Statute, the Rules or the Regulations. Both the VCLT and the 
Statute only provide for withdrawal from the treaty. However, even if the Vienna law was 
applied to withdrawal of a situation by analogy, the nature and purpose of the ICC Statute is such 
that the interest of the international community as a whole, by far supersede that of individual 
states. This makes withdrawal of a self-referred situation to the Court untenable. Even assuming 
that a state successfully withdrew from the ICC a self-referred situation, such a state would still 
be bound to perform the obligations that arose before the withdrawal, to cooperate with the Court 
for the purpose of the proceedings that started prior to the withdrawal and would not prejudice 
the continued consideration by the Court of any matter that arose before the effective date of the 
withdrawal. In turn, this renders withdrawal of a self-referred situation an academic exercise vis-
à-vis the matter that is already before the Court at the time the withdrawal is made. 
2. Recommendations 
This year, the Court celebrated ten years of fighting impunity. During this term, the Court has 
been seized with 16 cases arising out of eight situations. One judgment has been delivered so far 
(Thomas Lubanga Dyilo) while six cases are at the trial stage and nine at pre-trial stage. 
However, there has been relatively little judicial pronouncement on complementarity by the 
Court in so far as it relates to the queries raised in this paper. Admittedly, complementarity and 
the admissibility criteria raise many questions for which there have been insufficient answers 
from the Court. Although the few decisions so far provide some insight on the subject, the 
picture is not complete. Notably, most of the queries raised by the author in this paper can only 
be affirmatively answered by judicial interpretation on the respective statutory provisions. 
Typical of newly established institutions, they need time and experience to find their proper path. 
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Therefore, the challenge is incumbent upon the various stakeholders involved in the international 
criminal justice dispensation system; the Judges, the Prosecutor and the Defence to raise these 
pertinent issues as various cases traverse the Court. The Statute has a sufficient legal framework 
but the respective parties have not raised these contentious issues thereby leaving a gap between 
the contentions and judicial rulings. The author can only implore the respective parties to 
relentlessly raise these queries so that the law is made certain and predictable and thereby 
satisfying a basic tenet of rule of law. 
Lastly, since the two pillars of complementarity rest on respect for primacy of domestic criminal 
jurisdictions and efficiency and effectiveness, the prosecutorial policy should be reversed from 
internationalising local justice to localising international justice – this could be attained by 
promoting positive complementarity through encouraging bilateral and multilateral cooperation 
to support and assist domestic criminal jurisdictions. This way, the Court would be making a 
substantial contribution to ending impunity while enhancing sustainable domestic capacity. State 
Party compliance could be secured by a practice of „naming and shaming‟ non-compliant states 
thereby exerting pressure on them. The Assembly of States Parties (ASP), as the superintending 
body over the Court, could then take measures against states that fail to discharge their duty.    
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